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Judicial Review of International Adjudicatory Decisions: 





Domestic adjudication regularly offers parties the option to have a judgment of a first instance court 
reviewed by a court of appeal, and possibly even to challenge the appeal decision before a supreme 
court. In international dispute settlement, judicial review long formed the exception: arbitral 
awards, such as those of the Permanent Court of Arbitration (PCA) or the Iran-US Claims Tribunal, 
like judgments of the International Court of Justice (ICJ), are final – no appeal is possible, although 
there is limited provision for revision. More recently established forms of international adjudication 
however, do allow for appeal: for example, the proceedings before the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), the International Criminal Court or the Court of Justice of the EU (the latter two, perhaps 
not incidentally, dealing with public/private disputes). Also in investor-State arbitration, it is 
possible to oppose ‘objectionable’ decisions. Litigants have three possibilities to challenge an award 
that has been rendered in an investor-State dispute settlement (ISDS) procedure: they can actively 
seek to have the award set aside by the courts of the seat of the arbitration; they can oppose any 
enforcement action, hoping that the courts of third States will refuse to enforce the award; or, 
against awards under the Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and 
Nationals of other States (ICSID Convention),
2
 they can apply for annulment. These ‘status quo’ 
mechanisms offer relatively little solace because they do not allow for any substantial review. 




Some commentators criticise the fact that it is impossible to appeal arbitral decisions on the 
international legality of possibly sensitive State measures, even though ISDS tribunals may have 
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ignored relevant elements or misapplied the law.
4
 Another criticism relates to the perceived absence 
of consistency in the jurisprudence of arbitral tribunals established under different arbitration 
institutions and rules.
5
 One proposed remedy would be to replace the existing ad hoc arbitration 
system with a standing court for international investment issues, including an appellate mechanism 
to allow for a substantial review. This article offers a cross-regime comparison of the constitutive 
elements of three existing review mechanisms: the ad hoc annulment procedure of the International 
Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), the WTO Appellate Body and the 
Optional Appellate Rules of the American Arbitration Association (AAA). This will help to 
evaluate the review models currently being developed in international investment law (the 
anticipatory model and a standing appellate tribunal, as advocated by the European Commission in 
its proposal for an Investment Court System (ICS)).
6
  Finally, this article will provide an outlook on 
the relationship of a new appeal process with existing review mechanisms and the potential of a 
multilateral appellate tribunal in investment disputes. 
 
II. Constitutive elements of international review mechanisms 
In this Part, the three selected comparator mechanisms and the new review models are briefly 
explained, then scrutinised in light of their constitutive elements: the legal consequences of a 
successful application; the scope and standard of review; the composition of the review panel; and 
provisions limiting the duration and cost of review proceedings. These four elements have been 
selected for comparative study because they shape the functioning and impact of an international 
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judicial review system, determining its coherence, consistency, efficiency and, ultimately, (the 




A. Selected comparator mechanisms 
1. ICSID ad hoc annulment procedure 
The ICSID Convention’s earliest draft, a 1962 World Bank document entitled “Working Paper in 
the Form of a Draft Convention”, made no provision for annulment.
8
 
In 1963, the annulment 
provisions of the International Law Commission Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure
9
 were 
inserted into the Preliminary Draft of a Convention on the Settlement of Investment Disputes 
between States and Nationals of other States.
10
 The decision to provide for an annulment procedure 
did not give rise to much debate but the specific grounds for annulment were discussed at length at 
a series of Regional Consultative Meetings, leading to the 1964 First Draft Convention, and at 
Legal Committee Meetings, resulting in the 1964 Revised Draft which was submitted for 
consideration by the Executive Directors of the World Bank.
11
 While further changes were made to 
other provisions of the Revised Draft, Article 52 (dealing with the grounds for annulment) remained 
unchanged.  
In the last two decades, steadily rising numbers of losing parties have applied for annulment, 
relative to the increasing number of ICSID Convention awards rendered (including awards 
embodying a settlement). Before 1985, only one application for annulment was decided while six 
awards had been rendered by an original tribunal resulting in an approximate average rate of 17% 
(amount of annulment applications / amount of original awards rendered).
12
 In the period between 
1985 and 1989, three ‘first’ annulment cases were conducted, followed by two ‘second’ annulment 
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cases between 1990 and 1994.
13
 Between 1995 and 1999, no annulment applications were 
registered. Between 1985 and 1999, sixteen awards were rendered of which fourteen were original 
awards under the ICSID Convention and two were resubmission awards leading to an approximate 
average rate of 32%. Between 2000 and 2004, ten ‘first’ annulment cases were instituted out of 
twenty-nine original ICSID Convention awards, resulting in an approximate average rate of 35%. 
During the period of 2005 to 2009, twenty-one annulment cases were instituted: twenty ‘first’ 
annulments,
14
 and one ‘second’ annulment. Concurrently, sixty awards were rendered: fifty-nine 
original awards under the ICSID Convention and one resubmission award resulting in an 
approximate average of 35% of original awards against which an annulment application was filed.  
Between 2010 and 2014, forty annulment cases were instituted, all of which were ‘first’ 
annulment cases.
15
 Eighty-four original awards under the ICSID Convention were rendered leading 
to an approximate average rate of 48%. Finally, in the ongoing period, 2015 to April 2016, thirteen 
annulment cases were instituted, all of which were ‘first’ annulment cases. During this period, 
thirty-three original awards under the ICSID Convention were rendered. This represents a drop in 
annulment applications back to an average of approximately 39%. Over the course of ICSID’s fifty 
years of existence, a total of ninety annulment cases were conducted,
16
 with over 90% of being 
brought in the last fifteen years. Nevertheless, this increase seems largely due to the growing 
number of investment disputes brought before ICSID tribunals, as the average number of awards 
against which annulment is sought, has only increased slightly in the last twenty years 
(notwithstanding a peak between 2010 and 2014). 
Investors initiated thirty-six annulment cases (all ‘first’ annulment) versus forty-nine 
annulment cases initiated by States (forty-eight ‘first’ annulments and one ‘second’ annulment); 
five annulment cases were initiated by both parties. Twenty annulment cases have been settled or 
discontinued while eighteen are pending.
17
 Of the remaining fifty-two cases, the application was 
entirely dismissed in thirty-seven decisions (of which fourteen were initiated by investors, twenty-
one by States, two by both); ten decisions partially annulled the challenged award (two brought by 
investors, six by States and two by both); and, five decisions annulled the challenged award in its 
entirety (three were initiated by investors and two by States). Discounting jointly brought 
applications, States have filed the majority of annulment applications (58% of all applications) and 
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they have also been more successful (62% of all annulments were in response to State applications). 
Furthermore, discounting pending and discontinued cases, about 29% of annulment proceedings 
have resulted in a partial or full annulment,
18
 although the number of successful annulment 
applications seems to be decreasing: between 2010 and 2016, only three awards were partially 




Table 1. Overview of ICSID annulment applications (based on ICSID data) 
 
In sum, the ICSID ad hoc annulment procedure continues to be relatively popular with both 
claimants and respondents so that it may seem to be functioning as a semi-appeal mechanism. 
Because the creation of any appellate structure in investment law will be building on this 
experience, the ICSID annulment system has been selected for the present analysis. 
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Year in which annulment decision was rendered 
Still pending Settlement or proceedings discontinued
Refusing annulment Partial annulment
Full annulment Total number of annulment cases brought





2. WTO Appellate Body 
The 1947 GATT stipulated that the contracting parties themselves, acting jointly, had to deal with 
disputes between individual Members:
20
 at first, they were decided by the Chairman of the GATT 
Council. Later, disputes were referred to Working Parties composed of representatives from all 
interested contracting parties, including the disputing parties, which adopted their reports by 
consensus. These Working Parties were, in turn, replaced by panels made up of independent 
experts, unrelated to the disputing parties, who wrote independent reports with recommendations 
for resolving the dispute. Only upon approval by the GATT Council, did these reports become 
legally binding on the disputing parties. As this procedure implied that the losing party had to join 
in the approval, no appeal procedure was needed. Remedying the inherent problems in the GATT 
dispute settlement system was given high priority on the agenda of the Uruguay Round 
negotiations, which resulted in a reversal of the approval procedure: a report was henceforth 
approved, unless the entire WTO membership (including the winning party) agreed to reject it. This 
was seen as necessitating the establishment of the Appellate Body in 1995 under Article 17 of the 




The number of appeal requests submitted to the WTO Appellate Body displays a decreasing 
trend. Relative to the total number of panel reports rendered (other than those established pursuant 
to DSU Article 21.5),
22
 one can see that between 1995 and 1999, between 75% and 100% of panel 
reports were appealed (twenty-three out of twenty-eight reports, or average: 82%).
23
  Between 2000 
and 2004, this was the case for 45% to 75% of panel reports (thirty-four out of fifty-five reports, or 
average: 62%).
24
 The number stayed more or less stable between 2005 and 2009 (twenty-seven out 
of forty-one reports, or 50% – 75%; average: 66%)
25
 and went down again between 2010 and 2014 
(thirty-one out of forty-eight reports, or 40% to 63% with an exceptional peak of 85% in 2014; 
average: 65%).
26
 In the ongoing period, 2015 to the present, eight appeal proceedings were initiated 
                                                 
20
  Article XXIII:2 of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (adopted 30 October 1947, entered into force 1 
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while thirteen panel reports were adopted (average: 62%) – bringing the total number of appealed 
reports to one hundred-twenty-three out of one-hundred eighty-five and confirming the existing 
trend. The average number of panel reports that are appealed, remains high: about two out of three 
(66%).  
 
Looking at the outcome of these appeal procedures:
27
 leaving aside pending and 
discontinued cases, seventeen Appellate Body reports fully upheld the panel reports at issue, four 
Appellate Body reports entirely reversed the panel reports and eighty-one Appellate Body reports 
modified the panel reports. This means that in a staggering 80% of appealed panel reports,
28
 the 
Appellate Body found that the panel did not (entirely) get it right. 
 
 
Table 2. Overview of WTO appeals (based on WTO data) 
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Year in which appeal was decided 
Still pending Settlement or proceedings discontinued
Rejected Modified
Reversed Total number of AB reports adopted





In sum, as the WTO Appellate Body offers a good example of an often-used international 
appellate mechanism and as it is the main model on which the European Commission has chosen to 
base its ICS Appellate Tribunal proposal, it has been selected as a comparator for the present 
analysis. 
 
3. AAA Optional Appellate Rules 
Due to the narrowly-defined statutory grounds used by domestic courts to set aside or reject the 
enforcement of an arbitral award, the American Arbitration Association (AAA) saw a need to 
provide an appeal option within the commercial arbitration process itself. As a response, in 2013, 
the Optional Appellate Rules were published by the International Centre for Dispute Resolution 
(ICDR), the international arm of the AAA.
29
 Unfortunately, no statistical data are available with 
regard to the practice under these Appellate Rules. Nevertheless, as the AAA/ICDR Rules form one 
of the very few illustrations of an appellate mechanism in international arbitration, this mechanism 
has been selected as a comparator for the present analysis. 
 
4. Models for appellate mechanisms in investor-State dispute settlement 
a. Anticipatory model: rendez-vous clauses 
Envisaging the establishment of an appellate mechanism is not a wholly novel evolution in the 
context of ISDS. Several US Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) contemplate the creation of a standing 
body to hear appeals from investor-State arbitral panels, but this has not yet materialized in practice. 
The drafters of the US-Chile FTA (2003) were the first to follow this ‘anticipatory model’ when 
they incorporated a provision stipulating that an appellate mechanism could be developed in the 
future, if this were to be created under a distinct multilateral agreement.
30
 The Dominican Republic-
Central America-US FTA (CAFTA) (2004) went slightly further through the insertion of a rendez-
vous clause requiring the institution of a Negotiating Group to develop an appellate body or similar 
mechanism,
31
 considering, among other things, the nature and composition of an appellate 
mechanism, the applicable scope and standard of review, transparency, the legal effect of decisions 
on appeal, and the relationship of the appellate review with other applicable rules. In spite of these 
clauses, no such negotiations have been publicized and no draft text regarding the establishment of 
any appellate mechanism has been announced. 
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 Article 10.19(10) of the US-Chile FTA. 
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According to the leaked “Directives for the negotiation on the Transatlantic Trade and 
Investment Partnership” adopted by the EU Council in 2013, “[c]onsideration should be given to 
the possibility of creating an appellate mechanism applicable to investor-to-state dispute settlement 
under the Agreement, and to the appropriate relationship between ISDS and domestic remedies”.
32
 
The European Parliament also repeatedly expressed its wish that an appellate mechanism be 
created, albeit without further specification.
33
 The first drafts of FTAs with an investment chapter 
negotiated by the EU (the Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) between 
Canada and the European Union and the EU-Singapore FTA) also followed the anticipatory model. 
In a Press Release of 29 February 2016, however, the European Commission made public that the 
EU and Canada were adopting a new approach on dispute settlement under CETA: 
 
While the original CETA text foresaw the possibility to establish an appeal mechanism in 
the future, the updated CETA text establishes at the entry into force of the Agreement an 
Appellate Tribunal. It also addresses the relationship between the decisions of the Appellate 
Tribunal and the Tribunal. The EU and Canada will promptly adopt a decision of the CETA 





In the current version of the FTA with Singapore, a rendez-vous clause is still incorporated, 
committing the Contracting Parties to look into the possibility of establishing an appellate 
mechanism.
35
 This clause has not yet been re-negotiated, but it is likely that this will occur after the 
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   European Commission, Press Release, ‘CETA: EU and Canada agree on new approach on investment in trade 
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35
  Article 9.30(1), EU-Singapore Free Trade Agreement. Authentic text as of May 2015, available at: 
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36
  Opinion 2/15, Request for an opinion submitted by the European Commission pursuant to Article 218(11) 
TFEU, OJ [2015] C332/45. 




b. ICS model: a standing Appellate Tribunal 
The creation of a standing Appellate Body for investment matters is envisaged by the European 
Commission as a process which would “ensure consistency and increase the legitimacy of the 
system by subjecting awards to review”.
37
 In addition to its incorporation in the revised CETA, this 
model has also been adopted in the EU–Vietnam FTA,
38
 and forms part of the text which the 
European Commission is currently negotiating with the US in the framework of the Transatlantic 
Trade and Investment Partnership (TTIP).
 39
 Even though none of these treaties has entered into 
force yet, their main characteristics will be evaluated below in light of the other review 
mechanisms. The TTIP and EU–Vietnam FTA provisions in this regard are more comprehensive 
than those in the CETA: where no reference to CETA is included in the footnotes, this means that 
no equivalent CETA provision exists. 
 
B. Legal consequences of a successful application 
1. Existing mechanisms 
ICSID Annulment – There is a fundamental difference between a successful appeal and an 
annulment: an ICSID ad hoc Annulment Committee cannot substitute its own judgment on the 
merits for the decision of the original tribunal and moreover, “annulment is concerned only with the 
legitimacy of the process of decision. It is not concerned with the substantive correctness of the 
decision. Appeal is concerned with both”.
40
 Thus, if an ad hoc Committee annuls an award, the 
latter is effectively (totally or partially) removed from the legal order. To that extent, either party 
may submit the dispute to another ICSID tribunal which will then take a new decision both on the 
facts and the law, insofar as the original decision has been annulled.
41
 Enforcement while an 
annulment proceeding is pending is in principle allowed, unless a stay of enforcement is issued by 
the ad hoc Committee. 
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 European Commission Fact sheet: Investment Protection and Investor-to State Dispute Settlement in EU 
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  European Commission, Draft Text TTIP – Trade in Services, Investment, E-Commerce (12 November 2015) 
available at: http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/november/tradoc_153955.pdf [hereafter Draft TTIP Investment 
Chapter]. 
40 
C. H. Schreuer, L. Malintoppi, A. Reinisch & A. Sinclair, The ICSID Convention: A Commentary, (2
nd
 ed.) 
(CUP 2009), p. 901. 
41 
Article 52.6 ICSID Convention. 




WTO Appellate Body –  The WTO Appellate Body is established to “hear appeals from panel 
cases”.
42
 While the appeal is pending, the panel report does not need to be implemented.
43
 The 
Appellate Body may uphold, modify or reverse the legal findings and conclusions of the panel.
44
 
The Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) and the parties are considered to have accepted the report by 
the Appellate Body without amendment unless the DSB decides by consensus not to adopt it.
45
 
Once the report has been accepted, it becomes binding upon the parties to the dispute, replaces the 




AAA/ICDR Optional Appellate Rules – Parties may use the AAA/ICDR Optional Appellate 
Arbitration Rules only in mutual agreement, either by contract or stipulation, regardless of whether 
the underlying award was conducted pursuant to the AAA/ICDR Rules.
47
 An Appeal Tribunal may 
uphold the underlying award, replace it with its own award (incorporating those aspects of the 
underlying award that are not vacated or modified), or request additional information.
48
 By contrast 
there is no provision for the Appeal Tribunal to order a new arbitration hearing or to send the case 
back to the original tribunal for correction or further review. The time period for commencement of 




2. ICS proposal 
When an appeal procedure is initiated, the Appeal Tribunal has three possible courses of action.  
First, it may “dismiss the appeal on an expedited basis where it is clear that the appeal is manifestly 
unfounded”.
50
 Secondly, the Tribunal may reject the appeal, in which case the “provisional award” 
becomes final.
 51
 Thirdly, if the appeal is well-founded, the Appeal Tribunal may modify or reverse 
the provisional award in whole or in part, specifying “precisely how it has modified or reversed the 
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  Marrakesh Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization (opened for signature 15 April 1994, 
entered into force 1 January 1995) 1867 UNTS 3, Annex 2 (Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the 
Settlement of Disputes) 1869 UNTS 401. 
43
  Congressional Research Service (United States), Dispute Settlement in the World Trade Organization (WTO): 
An Overview, November 26, 2012, page 10, available at: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RS20088.pdf; Y. Guohua et 
al., WTO Dispute Settlement Understanding: A Detailed Interpretation (Kluwer Law International 2005) 191. 
44 
Article 17.13 DSU. 
45 
Article 17.14 DSU. 
46
  P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and Materials, 291-
292 (2013). 
47
  Article A-1 of the Optional Appellate Rules. 
48
  Article A-19 of the Optional Appellate Rules. 
49
  Article A-2 (a) of the Optional Appellate Rules. 
50
  Article 29(2), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 28(2), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA Investment Chapter. 
51
  Article 29(2), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(9)(c)(ii) of the CETA; Article 
29(2), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 




relevant findings and conclusions of the Tribunal”.
52
 Notwithstanding such specification, the case 
will then be referred back to the original Tribunal which, after hearing the parties if appropriate, 
must revise its provisional award to reflect the findings and conclusions of the Appeal Tribunal, 
which are binding upon the original Tribunal.
 53
 The use of the term “provisional award” when 
referring to the award of the original Tribunal would seem to indicate that it will not be possible to 
exact enforcement of an award as long as the period to appeal has not expired, or, while the appeal 
is pending. This would seem the best option, which has been adopted in the appeal mechanisms 
under the WTO and the ICDR/AAA. An alternative possibility would be for a successful claimant 
before the original Tribunal to enforce this award at its own peril, subject to a stay of execution: if 
the Appeal Tribunal modifies or reverses the original award, any compensation already received 
would need to be repaid and additional ‘reparation costs’ might be due.  
 
The provision that the Appellate Tribunal, upon finding the appeal well-founded, remands 
the case to the original Tribunal (presumably with the original composition) seems unnecessarily 
complicated and a waste of time and resources for all parties involved. Under the ICSID annulment 
rules, a similar system exists and as the jurisprudence shows, this may pave the way towards 
increased interpretative discord and, potentially, even a second annulment procedure.
54
 Even though 
the decision on appeal in the proposed system would be binding for the original Tribunal, there 
risks being disagreement as to whether the revised provisional award accurately reflects the findings 
and conclusions of the Appeal Tribunal. In such case, it is not clear whether a second appeal would 
be possible, but even if it were, it would not be desirable for reasons of procedural efficiency. As 
the Appeal Tribunal has to indicate precisely how it has modified or reversed the relevant findings 
and conclusions of the Tribunal, it could easily (partially) replace the original award with its own 
decision, as is the prerogative of the WTO Appellate Body and the Appeal Tribunal under the 
Optional Appellate Rules of the ICDR/AAA.  
 
                                                 
52
  Article 29(2), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 28(3), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA Investment Chapter. 
53
  Article 28(7), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(7)(b) and Article 29(4), Section 3 
of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 
54
  See e.g., Amco Asia Corporation v Republic of Indonesia (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/1) Annulment decision of 
16 May 1988; Annulment decision of 17 December 1992; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3) Annulment decision of 3 July 2002; Annulment 
decision of 20 August 2007; Klöckner Industrie-Anlagen GmbH and others v. United Republic of Cameroon and 
Société Camerounaise des Engrais (ICSID Case No. ARB/81/2) Annulment decision of 3 May 1985; Annulment 
decision of 17 May 1990. 




C. Scope and standard of review 
1. Existing mechanisms 
ICSID Annulment – All ICSID awards are final and binding but they can be annulled on grounds 
exhaustively enumerated in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention: 
 
a. Improper constitution of the tribunal 
b. Manifest excess of powers by the tribunal 
b. Corruption of a tribunal member 
c. Serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure 
d. Failure to state reasons by the tribunal 
 
Parties have primarily invoked the grounds of manifest excess of powers, failure to state reasons, 
and serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure.
55
 Frequently all three grounds, or two 
out of the three, have been invoked together.  
 
WTO Appellate Body – According to the DSU, an appeal is limited to issues of law covered in the 
panel report and legal interpretations developed by the panel.
56
 After two decades of jurisprudence, 
the common view is that the Appellate Body has remained within this mandate: allegations 




AAA/ICDR Optional Appellate Rules – Under the Rules, the Appeal Tribunal applies a standard of 
review more expansive than that which is allowed by existing US federal and state statutes to vacate 
an award. Parties are permitted to appeal on the grounds that the underlying award is based on “(1) 





                                                 
55
  V. Balaš, Review of Awards, in P. Muchlinski et al. (Eds.) The Oxford Handbook of International Investment 
Law 1125 at 1146-1150 (2008); C. Knahr, ‘Annulment and its Role in the Context of Conflicting Awards’, in M. 
Waibel et al. (Eds.) The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, 151 at pp. 153-160 (2010). 
56 
Article 17.6 DSU. 
57
  See e.g. P. Van den Bossche, The Law and Policy of the World Trade Organization: Text, Cases and 
Materials, 235-241 (2013). 
58
  Article A-10 of the Optional Appellate Rules; see R. B. Jacobs, “Examining the Elusiveness of Finality in 
Arbitration, and the New Avenues of Appeal” Alternatives to the High Cost of Litigation: The newsletter of the 
International Institute for Conflict Prevention and Resolution, Vol. 33 no. 1 January 2015, p. 11-12. 




2. ICS proposal 
A permanent Appeal Tribunal is to be established to hear appeals from the awards issued by the 
Tribunal,
59
 on the grounds 
 
(a) that the Tribunal has erred in the interpretation or application of the applicable law;  
(b) that the Tribunal has manifestly erred in the appreciation of the facts, including the 
appreciation of relevant domestic law; or, 
(c) provided for in Article 52 of the ICSID Convention, in so far as they are not covered 




This represents an extension of the applicable scope set out in the earlier proposal of the 
Commission, in which the Appellate Tribunal could only hear “appeals on issues of law covered in 
the Tribunal’s decision or award and legal interpretations developed by the Tribunal”.
61
 
Furthermore, the currently proposed Appeal Tribunal would be able to draw up its own working 
procedures,
62
 while the provisions on third-party funding, transparency, interim decisions, 
discontinuance and the role of non-disputing parties to the proceedings apply mutatis mutandis.
63
 
The formulation of the second ground, i.e. manifest error in appreciation of the facts, raises new 
questions: how is ‘manifest’ to be interpreted? Should the erroneous appreciation have been in itself 
determinative of the outcome of the decision, or is it sufficient that it was one of the contributing 
elements? If the former, this risks severely limiting the scope of appeal since virtually every 
decision will be based on multiple grounds, which are unlikely to be all erroneous. For this reason, 
the latter interpretation would seem preferable but in that case the question becomes: what 
distinguishes manifest from non-manifest contributing factors?  
 
Furthermore, as the Appeal Tribunal can also hear appeals on the grounds provided for in 
Article 52 of the ICSID Convention,
64
 it would be useful to clarify how exactly ‘manifest excess of 
powers by the tribunal’ and ‘serious departure from a fundamental rule of procedure’ are to be 
understood as the case law is divergent in this regard.
65
 For example, what is the difference between 
                                                 
59
  Article 10(1), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(1) of the CETA; Article 13(1), 
Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 
60
  Article 29(1), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(2) of the CETA; Article 28(1), 
Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 
61 
 Public consultation on modalities for investment protection and ISDS in TTIP, at 43-44, available at: 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2014/march/tradoc_152280.pdf  
62
  Article 10(10), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 13(10), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA Investment Chapter. 
63
  Article 29(5), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(6) of the CETA (on transparency 
and the role of non-disputing party); Article 28(7), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 
64
  Article 52(b) of the ICSID Convention. 
65
  For a detailed discussion on case law, see Timmer, Laurens J.E., Manifest Excess of Powers as a Ground for 
the Annulment of ICSID Awards, 14 Journal of World Investment and Trade 5 (2013) 775-803; Bishop, R. Doak, 




‘manifest’ and ‘serious’? Alternatively, if they are to be regarded as synonymous, does this mean 
that the departure of a fundamental rule of procedure by definition must have resulted in a different 
decision than would otherwise have been the case? Again, such strict interpretation would render 
this ground very difficult to invoke so the Appellate Tribunal should tread carefully when providing 
much-needed clarification in this regard. One risk is that the Appellate Tribunal’s decisions may in 
turn create conflict with the ICSID ad hoc Annulment Committees’ interpretations of the same 
provisions. Also, which rules of procedure are fundamental? Perhaps the most straightforward 
option would be to exhaustively list such procedural rules in the treaty itself. 
 
Contrary to the equivalent provision under the DSU, ‘the appreciation of relevant domestic 
law’ has been added to the scope of review in recognition of the often crucial role of national law in 
international adjudication. For example, the assessment of whether a property title exists under 
domestic law, can determine whether an investment is covered by an international investment 
agreement. More generally, the proposed scope of review seems to be broader than that of both the 
WTO Appellate Body (“issues of law covered in the panel report and legal interpretations 
developed by the panel”) and the Appeal Tribunals under the ICDR/AAA (“errors of law that are 
material and prejudicial and/or on determinations of fact that are clearly erroneous”) as neither of 
these systems refer to, e.g., improper constitution of the tribunal, manifest excess of powers, 
corruption or serious departure from procedural rules. 
 
The EU intends to include a provision allowing for joint statements of the States parties on 
how particular treaty provisions should be interpreted, which will be binding on the Tribunal and 
the Appellate Tribunal
66
 – similar to the interpretative powers of the Free Trade Commission (FTC) 
under NAFTA. A point of concern is the Commission’s assertion that “[t]hese binding 
                                                                                                                                                                  
Annulment under the ICSID Convention (OUP 2012); Scherer, Matthias, ICSID Annulment Proceedings based on 
Serious Departure from a Fundamental Rule of Procedure: (Article 52(1)(d) of the ICSID Convention), in: The 
Relationship between Constitutional Values, Human Rights and Arbitration / ed. Alexander J. Bělohlávek, Naděžda 
Rozehnalová (Juris 2011) 211-226. 
66
  Article 13(5), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter: ‘Where serious concerns arise as regards 
matters of interpretation relating to [the Investment Protection or the Resolution of Investment Disputes and Investment 
Court System Section of this Agreement], the [] Committee may adopt decisions interpreting those provisions. Any 
such interpretation shall be binding on the Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal. […]’ [footnote omitted]; Article 8.31(3) 
CETA: “Where serious concerns arise as regards matters of interpretation that may affect investment, the Committee on 
Services and Investment may, pursuant to Article 8.44.3(a), recommend to the CETA Joint Committee the adoption of 
interpretations of this Agreement. An interpretation adopted by the CETA Joint Committee shall be binding on a 
Tribunal established under this Section. The CETA Joint Committee may decide that an interpretation shall have 
binding effect from a specific date.”; Article 16(4), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter: “Where 
serious concerns arise as regards issues of interpretation which may affect matters relating this Chapter, the Trade 
Committee may adopt interpretations of provisions of this Agreement. Any such interpretation shall be binding upon the 
Tribunal and the Appeal Tribunal. The Trade Committee may decide that an interpretation shall have binding effect 
from a specific date.” 




interpretations can also be made with respect to on-going ISDS cases. The ability for the Parties to 
the agreement to adopt binding interpretations is a safety valve in the event of errors by the 
tribunals.”
67
 Similarly, “[t]he [] Committee may decide that an interpretation shall have binding 
effect from a specific date” – without specifying whether such date could also lie in the past.
68
 One 
may wonder whether the drafters have thought through the legal implications of such powers. For 
example, could it not be seen as a breach of the principle of fair trial, if the ‘rules of the game’ can 
change while the ‘game’ is ongoing? In other words, should a party to a dispute have the power to 
impose its own interpretation of the applicable law? Admittedly, all parties to the treaty (including 
those not party to the dispute) have to agree to issue such a binding statement, but it would not be 
unheard-of for a home State not to support its own national for political or other reasons.
69
 Also, 
when speaking of a “safety valve in the event of errors by the tribunals” – does this mean that such 
a post-factum interpretation could invalidate an existing award and effectively pre-empt the powers 
of the Appeal Tribunal? Or would this only be binding upon future tribunals in other disputes?  
 
Particularly in the context of an appeals mechanism, the question arises whether a decision 
could be successfully appealed on the basis of a Tribunal’s interpretation of a certain provision 
(entirely within the scope of plausible interpretations at the time of its making), which became the 
object of a joint statement after the original award was rendered. It may be noted that the 
interpretative statement of the FTC concerning Article 1105 NAFTA (fair and equitable treatment) 
created less, rather than more, legal predictability, as some tribunals regarded this statement as a 
binding interpretation (albeit one subject itself to interpretation), whereas others saw it as venturing 
beyond interpretation into an (unlawful) amendment, and hence did not consider themselves 
bound.
70
 Neither under the WTO nor under the ICDR/AAA Appellate Rules could such situations 
occur – and it should also be avoided in the context of the new investment appellate mechanism. 
 
 
                                                 
67
  European Commission, Concept Paper, Investment in TTIP and beyond – the path for reform Enhancing the 
right to regulate and moving from current ad hoc arbitration towards an Investment Court (5 May 2015) p. 2, available 
http://trade.ec.europa.eu/doclib/docs/2015/may/tradoc_153408.PDF. 
68
  Article 13(5), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.31(3) of the CETA; Article 16(4), 
Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 
69
  E.g., The Renco Group, Inc. v. The Republic of Peru, (ICSID Case No. UNCT/13/1) Non-Disputing State Party 
Submission of the United States of America (10 September 2014); KBR, Inc. v. United Mexican States, (ICSID Case 
No. UNCT/14/1) Non-Disputing State Party Submission of the United States of America (30 July 2014). 
70
  The interpretation is within the FTA’s mandate: Loewen Group, Inc. v. United States, (ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/98/3 (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2003), Award, (26 June 2003), 125-26; United Parcel Service of 
America, Inc. v. Canada, (NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), Award on Jurisdiction, (22 November 2002), 97; Mondev 
Int'l Ltd. v. United States, (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/2; NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2002), Award, (11 October 
2002). 120-21. The interpretation is outside of the FTA’s mandate: Pope & Talbot, Inc. v. Canada, 
(NAFTA/UNCITRAL Tribunal), Final Award, (11 March 2002), paras. 39-42; Methanex Corp. v. United States, 
(NAFTA Ch. 11 Arb. Trib. 2005), Final Award, (7 August 2002), pt. IV, ch. C, 18. 




D. Composition of the review panel 
1. Existing mechanisms 
ICSID Annulment – On receipt of the annulment application, the President of the World Bank 
(‘Chairman’) appoints from the Panel of Arbitrators an ad hoc Committee of three persons. 
Extensive limitations apply to the composition of this ad hoc Committee, excluding, among others, 
nationals of either the home or host State of the investor as well as the States of nationality of the 
original Tribunal members.
71
 ICSID designees have to be “persons of high moral character and 
recognised competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or finance, who may be relied upon 
to exercise independent judgment”.
72
 Before or at the first session, each member has to sign a 
declaration disclosing any potential conflicts of interest.
73
 A party may file a request with the ICSID 
Secretary-General to disqualify one or more Committee members “on account of any fact indicating 
a manifest lack of the [required] qualities”.
74
 The challenged member(s) may furnish explanations 
and unless the proposal relates to a majority of the members, the other members will promptly 
consider and vote on the proposal in the absence of the member concerned.
75
 Based on the (limited) 
case law, it would seem that this high threshold is almost never considered to be met.
76
 The exercise 
of ancillary activities is not restricted and there is no ICSID-specific Code of Conduct, but in 




WTO Appellate Body – The Appellate Body is composed of seven members with demonstrated 
expertise in law, international trade and the subject matter of the covered agreements generally, who 
are appointed for a term of four years (with possible reappointment for another four-year term).
78
 
The Appellate Body sits on each case in a division of three members. The members of each division 
are randomly selected and there is no prohibition against Appellate Body members sitting on cases 
                                                 
71 
 Limitations on the membership of the committee are set out in Article 52.3 of the ICSID Convention, 
according to which: […] None of the members of the Committee shall have been a member of the Tribunal which 
rendered the award, shall be of the same nationality as any such member, shall be a national of the State party to the 
dispute or of the State whose national is a party to the dispute, shall have been designated to the Panel of Arbitrators by 
either of those States, or shall have acted as a conciliator in the same dispute. […]. 
72 
Article 14.1 of the ICSID Convention; see also sections 2 and 5, Chapter IV of the ICSID Convention. 
73
  Rule 6(2) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
74
  Article 57 of the ICSID Convention [emphasis added]. 
75
  Rule 9(3)-(4) of the ICSID Arbitration Rules. 
76
  See e.g., Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. & Vivendi Universal v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/97/3) Decision on the challenge of to the President of the Committee (3 October 2001); Nations Energy 
Corporation, Electric Machinery Enterprises Inc. and Jaime Jurado v. Republic of Panama (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/06/19) Decision on the Proposal for the Disqualification of a Member of the Annulment Committee (7 Sept. 
2011); Total S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/04/01) Decision on the Argentine Republic’s proposal to 
disqualify Ms. Teresa Cheng (26 Aug. 2015). 
77
  E.g., IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest in International Arbitration, adopted by resolution of the IBA 
Council (23 Oct. 2014): http://www.ibanet.org/Publications/publications_IBA_guides_and_free_materials.aspx [2014 
IBA Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest]. 
78 
Article 17.3 DSU. 




involving the State of which they are a national.
79
 After the oral hearing, which is attended only by 
the three members of the division, the written pleadings in each case are discussed amongst all 
members of the Appellate Body, although the final decision is to be made by the three-member 
division. This practice, known as ‘collegiality’, aims at ensuring that regional or legal culture 
differences in a particular case are fully understood.
80
 All persons serving on the Appellate Body 
have to be available at all times and on short notice, and stay abreast of WTO dispute settlement 
activities and other relevant activities.
81
 WTO Appellate Body members are prohibited from being 
affiliated with any government and they cannot participate in the consideration of any disputes that 




AAA/ICDR Optional Appellate Rules – The ad hoc Appeal Tribunal is selected from the AAA’s 
Appellate Panel, or, if it concerns an international dispute, from its International Appellate Panel.
83
 
The AAA Panels consist of former federal and state judges and neutrals with strong appellate 
backgrounds. If the parties have not appointed an Appeal Tribunal and have not provided for any 
other method of appointment, the AAA sends each party an identical list of ten names of persons 
chosen from its (International) Appellate Panel.
84
 The parties are encouraged to agree to the Appeal 
Tribunal based on the submitted list, otherwise, each party has to strike the names of persons it 
objects to, number the remaining names in order of preference, and return the list to the AAA, 
which will then appoint the three members of the Appeal Tribunal itself,
 85
 unless the parties have 
agreed to utilize a single arbitrator. The AAA also appoints the Chairperson of the Tribunal.
86
 The 
Appeal Tribunal members are subject to the applicable code of ethics and to disclosure 
obligations.
87
 Under the ICDR/AAA rules, appeal tribunal members also have to comply with the 
ethical code, in particular its disclosure obligations, but there are no limitations to their ancillary 
activities; on the contrary, serving on an appeal tribunal is, for most list members, an ancillary job 
itself. 
                                                 
79
  Rule 6(2) WTO Working Procedures for Appellate Review; J. Hillman, Moving Towards an International Rule 
of Law? The Role of the GATT and the WTO in its Development, in G. Marceau, A History of Law and Lawyers in the 
GATT/WTO: The Development of the Rule of Law in the Multilateral Trading System 60 at 70 (2015). 
80
  Rule 4 WTO Working Procedures for Appellate Review; P. Delimatsis, Institutional Transparency in the 
WTO, in A. Bianchi & A. Peters (Eds.) Transparency in International Law 112 at 122-123 (2013); A. Alvarez-Jimenez, 
The WTO Appellate Body’s Decision-Making Process: A Perfect Model for International Adjudication? 12 Journal of 
International Economic Law 289, at 301ff (2009); D.P. Steger, Improvements and Reforms of the WTO Appellate Body, 
in F. Ortino (Ed.) The WTO Dispute Settlement System, 1995-2003 40 at 43-44 (2004). 
81
  Article 17.3 of the WTO DSU. 
82
  Article 17.3 of the WTO DSU. 
83
  Article A-4 (a) of the Optional Appellate Rules. 
84
  Article A-5 (a) of the Optional Appellate Rules. 
85
  Article A-5 (b) of the Optional Appellate Rules. 
86
  Article A-5 (c) of the Optional Appellate Rules. 
87
  Article A-4 (b) of the Optional Appellate Rules. 





2. ICS proposal 
The Appeal Tribunal is to be composed of six members: two nationals of a Member State of the 
European Union, two nationals of the United States and two nationals of third countries.
88
 The 
Contracting Parties are to each propose three candidates, two nationals and one non-national, to 
serve as members of the Appeal Tribunal.
89
 A Committee would be empowered to “increase the 
number of the Members of the Appeal Tribunal by multiples of three”, to be appointed on the same 
(two–one) basis.
90
 The Appeal Tribunal members are to be appointed for a six-year term, renewable 
once.
91
 The President and Vice-President are to be selected by lot for a two-year term among the 
members that are nationals of third countries.
92
 As the standard composition entails that there are 
only two such members, it would seem that they are to swap roles every other year. If ICSID-type 
nationality limitations had applied to an Appeal Tribunal established under the new investment 
agreements, this would have entailed that the large majority of people with relevant expertise would 
have been prohibited from serving. Instead, the Commission has followed the DSU provision which 
allows members of the Appellate Body to sit on cases involving the State of which they are a 
national. Similarly, no nationality restrictions are in place for members of Appellate Tribunals 
under the ICDR/AAA Rules. Allowing nationals of States Parties to serve as members of the 
Appellate Body may also contribute to reassuring them that their interests and particular 
sensitivities will be taken into account – akin to the ICJ procedure whereby States can ask for a 
judge of their nationality to be appointed to the bench on an ad hoc basis in disputes to which they 




Candidates for membership of the Appeal Tribunal have to  
possess the qualifications required in their respective countries for appointment to the 
highest judicial offices, or be jurists of recognised competence. They shall have 
demonstrated expertise in public international law. It is desirable that they have expertise in 
                                                 
88
  Article 10(2), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 13(2), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(7)(f) of the CETA. 
89
  Article 10(3), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 13(3), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA Investment Chapter. 
90
  Article 10(4), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 13(4), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA Investment Chapter. 
91
  Article 10(5), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter, as a transitory arrangement, “the terms of three 
of the six persons appointed immediately after the entry into force of the agreement, to be determined by lot, shall 
extend to nine years.” Also, “[v]acancies shall be filled as they arise. A person appointed to replace a person whose 
term of office has not expired shall hold office for the remainder of the predecessor's term.”; Cf. Article 13(5), Section 3 
of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter (four-year term; the terms of three of the six persons appointed 
immediately after entry into force extend to six years). 
92
  Article 10(6), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 13(6), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA Investment Chapter. 
93
  Article 31(2), United Nations, Statute of the International Court of Justice (18 April 1946) 33 UNTS 993. 




international investment law, international trade law and the resolution of disputes arising 




This formulation raises more questions than it answers: a concept such as ‘recognised 
competence’ is very much open to interpretation: recognised by whom and for what purpose? 
Furthermore, in a highly technical matter such as international investment and trade law, it is not 
merely ‘desirable’ that judges have experience, it should be mandatory in order to guard the quality 
of the judgments, to create a level-playing field between the members of the Appeal Tribunal and to 
avoid that specific judges can exert more influence on decisions than others due to differences in 
expertise. This has been recognised, for example, in the rules concerning the constitution of the 
WTO Appellate Body, where members need demonstrated expertise in law, international trade and 
the subject matter of the covered agreements, as well as in the ICDR/AAA Rules where panel lists 
only include people with ample relevant expertise. Similarly, ICSID Annulment Committee 
members need to have “recognised competence in the fields of law, commerce, industry or 
finance”.
95
 Making subject-matter expertise a mandatory requirement is hence (rightfully) the rule 
rather than the ‘desirable’ exception and one way to guarantee this would be to allow for challenges 
of members, not only for conflicts of interests, but also for lack of relevant expertise. 
 
A valid point of critique on the current ISDS system, including the ICSID annulment 
procedure, is that the pool of regularly appointed arbitrators is too limited and not sufficiently 
diverse. When detailing how the roster of (Appeal) Tribunal members will be compiled, the 
Commission has regrettably omitted any specification as to whether and how adequate gender and 
geographical distribution (for example, representation of the smaller EU Member States) will be 
ensured. This consideration is equally absent from the provisions on composition of Appellate 
Tribunals under the ICDR/AAA Rules as well as for the WTO Appellate Body (although members 
should be “broadly representative of membership in the WTO”).
96
  In order to increase efficiency, 
the Appeal Tribunal is to hear appeals in divisions consisting of three members chaired by the third-
country national.
97
 This division is to be established by the President of the Tribunal on a rotation 
basis, yet simultaneously ensuring that “the composition of each division is random and 
unpredictable, while giving equal opportunity to all Members to serve”.
98
 This is similar to the 
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  Article 10(7), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(4) of the CETA; Article 13(7), 
Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 
95 
Article 14.1 of the ICSID Convention; see also see sections 2 and 5, Chapter IV of the ICSID Convention. 
96
  Article 17.3 DSU. 
97
  Article 10(8), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(5) of the CETA; Article 13(8), 
Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 
98
  Article 10(9), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 8.28(5) of the CETA; Article 13(9), 
Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam FTA Investment Chapter. 




organisation of the WTO Appellate Body, although it is recommended that the ‘collegiality 
practice’ whereby all Appellate Body members are involved in the deliberations of each case, also 
be adopted in order to guarantee optimal consistency and predictability of appellate decisions. This 
practice is absent in the ICDR/AAA appellate mechanism, but as these cases concern disputes 
between private parties, the public interest in the development of a jurisprudence constante may be 
viewed as less essential. 
 
Finally, like WTO Appellate Body Members, all members of the Appeal Tribunal are to be 
available at all times, on short notice and be abreast of other dispute settlement activities under the 
relevant investment chapter.
99
 No similar provision can be found in the ICSID Convention and 
Arbitration Rules or the ICDR/AAA Appellate Rules (presumably because the pool of potential 
members contains far more persons so it is not necessary that all are available at all times). It is not 
required, however, that members of the Appeal Tribunal renounce all ancillary activities, as long as 
they refrain from taking on work “as counsel or as party-appointed expert or witness in any pending 
or new investment protection dispute under this or any other agreement or domestic law”
100
 and 
comply with the Code of Conduct.
101
 Like WTO Appellate Body Members, Members of the Appeal 
Tribunal “shall not be affiliated with any government” and “shall not take instructions from any 
government or organisation with regard to matters related to the dispute”.
102
 However, a footnote is 
added, stating that “this does not imply that persons who are government officials or receive an 





In terms of interpreting a term in accordance with its ordinary meaning, it would seem 
impossible to view government officials and those paid by a government as ‘not affiliated with any 
government’. In order to ensure (the perception of) impartiality, such persons ought to be excluded 
from serving on the Appeal Tribunal bench. As a comparison, under the International Bar 
Association Guidelines on Conflicts of Interest, the non-waivable ‘red list’ includes situations in 
which an arbitrator has a significant financial interest in one of the parties (for example, receiving 
remuneration from one of the parties) or regularly advises a party or an affiliate of a party, and 
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  Article 10(11), Section 3, of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter; Article 13(3), Section 3 of the EU-Vietnam 
FTA Investment Chapter. 
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  Article 11(1), Section 3 of the Draft TTIP Investment Chapter. 
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receives a significant financial income therefrom.
104
 This means that there are justifiable doubts as 
to this person’s impartiality and independence, so (s)he is disqualified from adjudicating the case. 
As an alternative solution to a standing ICS Appellate Tribunal, a roster of unpaid ‘available and 
qualified arbitrators’ could be compiled from which adjudicators could be drawn if/when a dispute 
arises. This would suffice to handle the workload and be most cost-effective. 
 
The Commission envisages that at some point in the future, the members of the Appellate 
Tribunal might serve on a full-time basis, in which case they will not be “permitted to engage in any 
occupation, whether gainful or not, unless exemption is exceptionally granted by the President of 
the Appeal Tribunal”.
105
 Unless this Appellate Tribunal would be put in charge of adjudicating 
appeals from a great number of investment treaties, it seems doubtful that this would ever be 
necessary. If this were to happen, its composition (three EU judges, three US judges and three third-
country nationals) would need to be revised: all Contracting State Parties would presumably wish to 
appoint three of their nationals to the Appellate Tribunal, which would in turn significantly decrease 
the number of cases that each member would have to deal with. Hence, even in such a case, serving 
on the Appellate Body would not require full time employment.  
 
E. Duration and cost limits 
1. Existing mechanisms 
ICSID Annulment – An ICSID annulment application must be made within one hundred-twenty 
days of the rendering of the original award.
106
 Time limits on the process of annulment and the 
submission of the claim to a new tribunal are not set out in the ICSID Convention but between mid-
2007 and mid-2012, the average annulment proceeding that resulted in a decision on the merits took 
twenty-six months from the registration to the issuance of the decision.
107
 In most ICSID annulment 
proceedings to date, the ad hoc Committee also ordered the parties to share equally costs incurred 
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WTO Appellate Body – The disputing party must notify the DSB of its decision to appeal before the 
adoption of the panel report (between the twentieth and the sixtieth day after circulation of the panel 
report).
109
 The Appellate Body in turn delivers its report within sixty days (or, exceptionally, ninety 
days) from the date a party to the dispute formally notifies its decision to appeal
110
– a deadline 
which is respected in almost 90% of the cases.
111
 Following the circulation of the Appellate Body 
report, the DSB has thirty days to decide by consensus not to adopt it.
112
 The DSU does not contain 
any specific provisions to limit the additional costs which an appeal entails: disputing parties carry 
their own legal representation costs but there is no fee for initiating or participating in appeals. The 
costs of the Appellate Body are borne by the WTO Members; its budget amounting to 




AAA/ICDR Optional Appellate Rules – The Optional Appellate Arbitration Rules anticipate a 
process that can be completed in about three months.
114
 Appeals will usually be determined on the 
written documents submitted by the parties, with no oral argument.
115
 Due to the confidentiality of 
the procedures, no specific data are available with regard to the ICDR/AAA appellate procedures. 
The Appellant/Cross-Appellant may be assessed the appeal costs, and other reasonable costs of the 
Appellee/Cross-Appellee, including attorneys’ fees, incurred after the commencement of the appeal 





2. ICS proposal 
The proposal puts forward strict time limits, although it is unclear what the repercussions would be 
if these deadlines are not met. The original Tribunal has to issue its provisional award within 
eighteen months of the submission of the claim, or adopt a decision specifying the reasons for the 
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 Either disputing party “may appeal before the Appeal Tribunal a provisional award, within 
90 days of its issuance”.
118
 The appeal proceedings are not to exceed one-hundred-eighty days from 
the date of formal notification of the appeal, unless the Appeal Tribunal informs the disputing 
parties of the reasons for the delay together with an estimate of the period within which it will issue 
its decision.
 119
 In no case should the proceedings exceed two-hundred-seventy days. If the Appeal 
Tribunal modifies or reverses the original decision, the case is remanded to the Tribunal, which 
“shall seek to issue its revised award within 90 days of receiving the report of the Appeal 
Tribunal”.
120
 This would, in principle, mean that any procedure could last at most thirty months 
from the date of submission of the claim. In comparison with the shorter WTO Appellate Body 
deadline, but bearing in mind the duration of the ICSID annulment procedures, one-hundred-eighty 
days from notification to decision on appeal seems reasonable – although the inclusion of some 
form of ramification should this deadline not be met, in the absence of deliberate delaying tactics on 
the part of the parties, could be considered. 
 
Costs for the proposed Appeal Tribunal are delimited as well: its members are to be paid a 
monthly retainer fee and a fee for each day worked as a member, about the same as for WTO 
Appellate Body members (being a retainer fee of around €7,000 per month).
121
 In case the members 
of the Appeal Tribunal were to serve on a full-time basis, these fees would be transformed into a 
regular salary.
 122
 Similar to the WTO system, the retainer fee of the members as well as expenses 
for support from a Secretariat are to be paid equally by the Contracting Parties into an account 
managed by the ICSID or PCA Secretariat.
123
 Whether the remuneration per day of meetings or 
other work performed in connection with the proceedings (currently set at US$3,000, or about 
€2,600)
124
 as well as subsistence allowances and reimbursement of travel expenses, will be 
allocated among the disputing parties is unclear. The TTIP draft text only provides that “[t]he 
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remuneration of the Members shall be paid equally by both Parties”,
125
 without further specifying 
whether this includes both the retainer fee and the fee for days worked. Since such specification has 
been included with regard to the first instance ICS Tribunal,
 126
 it would seem that all costs of the 
Appeal Tribunal are to be carried by the Contracting Parties, and none by the investor. In the EU–
Vietnam FTA, on the other hand, it has been clearly stipulated that, like under the ICDR/AAA 
Rules, “such fees and expenses shall be allocated by the Tribunal among the disputing parties”.
127
 





In any case, a disputing party lodging an appeal will have to “provide security for the costs 
of appeal and for any amount awarded against it in the provisional award”.
129
 This could be hard on 
the applicant on appeal, particularly if this is the respondent State, as it might have to provide a 
large sum at the outset, which may negatively affect its decision to appeal, even if it has strong 
grounds for doing so.  
 
F. Assessment 
The selected annulment and appellate mechanisms were scrutinised above in light of four 
constitutive elements which shape the functioning and impact of international judicial review 
systems. The question is: how has this determined their coherence, predictability, efficiency and, 
ultimately, (the public perception of) their legitimacy?  
 
ICSID Annulment – The ICSID annulment system is increasingly being criticised for a number of 
reasons. In terms of predictability, it has been suggested that several ad hoc Committees 
overstepped the boundaries of their mandate so as to “improperly re-examine […] the merits of a 
case, thereby effectively transforming an annulment proceeding into an appeal”.
130
 It is not 
desirable from the viewpoint of creating a stable legal environment that some ad hoc Committees 
seem willing to point out errors in the application of the law, while others refuse to annul even 
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when concluding that the original tribunal applied the law wrongly.
131
 In view of the fact that 
annulment applications have led to a (wholly or partially) different decision in response to almost a 
third of the applications, question marks can be placed on awards that cannot withstand even a very 
restricted review.
132
 The unwillingness of the State to comply with awards that are apparently open 
to serious criticism is understandable.
133
 Moreover, due to the ad hoc character of the system, no 
safeguards for coherence are built into the system and as recourse to annulment procedures becomes 
more popular, arbitration’s reputed efficiency in terms of limited duration and costs is suffering. It 
is clear that, at the moment, its standard of legitimacy is rather negatively perceived by the majority 
of the public – all of which strengthens the call for a ‘real’ appellate review.  
 
WTO Appellate Body – The dispute settlement system of the WTO in general, and of the Appellate 
Body, in particular, is a central element in providing security and predictability to the multilateral 
trading system.
134
 The fact that four out of five appeal procedures lead to a modified or reversed 
report demonstrates the undisputable necessity of an appeal procedure (and raises valid questions as 
to the quality of the panel reports).
135
 Also, the distribution of adjudicator appointments in the WTO 
seems to be more evenly spread out compared to ICSID. That being said, the majority of the WTO 
Appellate Body Members have previously been affiliated with one of the WTO Member 
governments, thus potentially raising concerns regarding their political independence. Impartiality 
should, however, be considered as outweighing overall given the fixed-term appointments of the 
WTO Appellate Body Members (although this is arguably under dispute at the moment due to the 
US opposition to the renewal of the Korean Appellate Body member).
136
 Despite calls for the 
increase of the number of Appellate Body Members, such a possibility could negatively affect the 
practice of collegiality which is closely connected with its small membership.
137
  In terms of 
substance, the WTO Appellate Body’s adherence to previous case law has contributed to 
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jurisprudential coherence and predictability.
138
 Finally, when it comes to the consideration of non-
trade-related interests, the WTO Appellate Body has striven (with varying degrees of success)
 139
 to 
strike a balance, so that none of the competing rights will cancel out the other and thereby distort 
and nullify or impair the balance of rights and obligations constructed by the Members. The 
location of the line of equilibrium is not fixed and unchanging; it moves as the kind and the shape 
of the measures at stake vary and as the facts making up specific cases differ.
140
 The Appellate 
Body’s exemplary record in terms of restricting the duration and cost of proceedings attests to its 
efficiency. On balance, the WTO Appellate Body system is widely perceived as successful in 




AAA/ICDR Optional Appellate Rules – As the ICDR Optional Appellate Rules are applied in 
confidential disputes between private commercial parties, the lack of available data prevents any 
assessment of the coherence and predictability of its decisions. At least on paper, these Rules do 
provide a model to incorporate an appeals mechanism in an arbitration context, while maintaining 
the advantages of, first and foremost, the flexibility and efficiency, of arbitral procedures.  To date, 
the practical relevance of the ICDR Optional Appellate Rules seems to be limited. Indeed, to the 
best knowledge of the author, so far such appellate awards have not been sought to be judicially 
enforced. While the appeal of this mechanism to commercial parties remains to be seen, it could be 
a “net good” given the fair balance struck between the opportunity of an additional review of a 




ICS proposal – The broad scope of grounds for review might allow for the development of coherent 
and predictable jurisprudence, although clarification with regard to the interpretation of the ICSID 
grounds would be welcome. The absence of nationality restrictions would seem to make sense and 
might even serve to improve the public acceptance of resulting decisions. Imposing time limits will 
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support the efficient rendering of decisions but this would even be improved if the Appeal Tribunal 
were to be allowed to replace an overturned decision with its own judgment, rather than requiring 
the case to be re-argued before a new Tribunal. This would also aid towards limiting the costs – 
about which much ambiguity remains. It is to be regretted that nothing in the treaties currently 
ensures access for small and medium-sized companies (who arguably need this system most), for 
example, in the form of linking the costs to the amount of the claim. In light of the fact that an 
Appeal Tribunal will be established for each treaty separately (at least initially, until agreement on a 
multilateral tribunal can be reached), it does not seem cost-beneficial to pay retainer fees to 
potentially dozens of judges and Appellate Tribunal members who may have few or no cases at all 
to decide. Worrying elements include the possibility for Contracting Parties to intervene and 
influence ongoing cases via joint statements, as well as the assumption that persons remunerated by 
a government would nevertheless be seen as non-government affiliated, impartial and independent. 
Finally, the absence of a requirement for Appeal Tribunal members to have extensive expertise in 
the subject-matter as well as the lack of any guarantee for adequate gender and geographic 
distribution ought to be remedied. Addressing these defects in the current ICS proposal for an 
Appeal Tribunal would significantly contribute to improving the (public perception of) the 
legitimacy of this dispute settlement system as a whole. 
 
III. Outlook 
A. Relationship between a new appeal process and existing review mechanisms 
One issue that has remained under dispute thus far in the discussions concerning the establishment 
of appeal options under various treaties concerns the relationship between the appeal mechanism 
and the existing review mechanisms (setting-aside, refusal to enforce and annulment). Would it be 
possible for example, for a State to simultaneously appeal and seek to have the original decision set 
aside by the domestic courts in the place of arbitration? Would it be possible for an investor to 
apply for enforcement of a decision which is being appealed? Although the European Commission 
frequently refers to ICSID throughout its draft Investment Chapters, it is unclear how the EU could 
appear as a party in an ICSID dispute,
143
 seeing that the ICSID Convention and the Additional 
Facility Rules only allow for State participation.
144
 Should this somehow be made possible, the 
question is whether a decision can simultaneously be appealed against and the subject of an 
annulment procedure. The same questions arise with regard to the appeal decision itself: can it form 
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the object of setting-aside, refusal to enforce or annulment? If nothing is stipulated to the contrary 
in the relevant agreement, there is arguably no legal obstacle to answering ‘yes’ to all these 
questions. However, from a procedural economy perspective, this would be undesirable – as has 
been recognised by the European Commission which proposes that final ICS awards cannot be 
subject to further “appeal, review, set aside, annulment or any other remedy”.
145
 Any Contracting 
Party has to recognize these awards rendered as binding and “enforce the pecuniary obligation 
within its territory as if it were a final judgement of a court in that Party”,
146
 but execution remains 





For the benefit of all parties involved, a solution ought to be worked out to prevent extensive 
litigation at the enforcement stage before domestic courts as seen in, for example, the Russian 
opposition to the Yukos award and the Ecuadorian non-compliance with the Chevron award (both 
rendered by a PCA tribunal).
148
 Once a State has undertaken certain international obligations as 
well as chosen to subject itself to a dispute settlement mechanism; and after this independent and 
impartial body (in first instance and on appeal) has found a State in breach of these obligations, it 
would make a mockery of the judicial process if such State would nevertheless be able to lawfully 
refuse to comply. The European Commission’s answer to this conundrum is to stipulate that all 
awards rendered under the proposed system would automatically be deemed in conformity with the 
New York Convention as well as the ICSID Convention.
149
 It is, however, difficult to see how 
domestic courts in third countries would be bound by this ex ante stamp of approval, when faced 
with a request of enforcement. One, rather cumbersome, option would be to conclude a series of 
bilateral agreements with States in which enforcement is likely to be sought. A recognition 
provision could in any case be inserted as a matter of course in all EU agreements with an 
investment chapter so that at least the EU’s contracting partners all have to enforce decisions 
resulting from the new ICS. 
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B. Towards a multilateral appellate mechanism? 
An appellate mechanism should preferably be developed at the multilateral level in cooperation 
with the relevant arbitral institutions, because a situation in which each IIA has its own appeal 
mechanism risks leading to even greater unpredictability. However, in view of the debacle of the 
Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI),
150
 a multilateral institution may still be out of 
political reach. Bearing in mind that more than half of the world’s IIAs currently in force involve 
EU Member States, the EU would seem ideally placed to launch the initiative by creating an 
appeals mechanism that is common to all EU treaties under negotiation (TTIP, CETA, the FTAs 
with Vietnam, India and Singapore, the BIT with China, etc.). As the EU Member States BITs are 
being gradually replaced by EU IIAs, the new appellate system could be progressively expanded in 
bilateral negotiations through adding names to the roster of Appellate Tribunal members. This view 
seems to be shared by the European Commission, which has announced that in parallel to setting up 
bilateral appeals mechanisms, 
 
the EU should work towards the establishment of an international investment court and 
appellate mechanism with tenured judges with the vocation to replace the bilateral 
mechanism which would be established. This would be a more operational solution in the 
sense of applying to multiple agreements with multiple partners but it will require a level of 




The ultimate goal of the Commission is even stated to be “in the longer term, [to] support the 
incorporation of investment rules into the WTO. This would be an opportunity to simplify and 
update the current web of bilateral agreements to set up a clearer, more legitimate and more 
inclusive system”.
152
 While the latter would seem unlikely to become politically feasible in the 
foreseeable future, the bilateral mechanisms could in the long run serve as ‘stepping stones’ towards 
a multilateral appellate structure for investment disputes outside of the WTO context.  
 
IV.  Conclusions 
Where an appellate structure in international investment adjudication, allowing for a substantive 
review of all first-instance awards, seemed politically unrealistic before 2015, it would now appear 
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feasible that an appeal tribunal will be established relatively soon as Canada and Vietnam have 
already consented to incorporating it in CETA and the EU–Vietnam FTA, respectively, while 
Mexico and Singapore have indicated their willingness to discuss this with regard to their relevant 
EU FTAs.
153
 Whether this model will also be adopted in the TTIP, remains uncertain: US Trade 
Representative Michael Froman and a former US official are on record stating that an investment 
court with pre-appointed judges and an appellate mechanism is a no-go area from the US 
perspective: “well-intentioned but mistaken”.
154
 The creation of an appellate mechanism would 
undermine the finality of one-stop dispute resolution, abolishing a core feature of international 
arbitration. A frequently voiced worry is that losing parties will appeal as a matter of course. The 
WTO experience demonstrates that this may indeed occur in the first years, but that as soon as a 
predictable jurisprudence emerges, the number of appeals decreases – although the appeal rate 
remains high. One way to prevent frivolous appeals aimed at merely prolonging the proceedings 
and increasing the costs, would be to put in place a ‘loser pays’ system. 
 
This article has compared three existing international review mechanisms (the ICSID ad hoc 
annulment procedure, the WTO Appellate Body and the AAA/ICDR Optional Appellate Rules) in 
order to examine the potential of the ICS Appeal Tribunal, as advocated by the European 
Commission. These review mechanisms were scrutinised in light of their constitutive elements 
which shape the functioning and impact of an international judicial review system: the legal 
consequences of a successful application; the scope and standard of review; the composition of the 
review panel; and provisions limiting the duration and cost of review proceedings. Also, this article 
provided an outlook on the relationship of a new appeal process with existing review mechanisms 
and the potential of a multilateral appellate tribunal in investment disputes. To some extent, the ICS 
drafters have usefully drawn upon the experience of other review mechanisms, but in several 
respects, there is still room for improvement. Notwithstanding potential disadvantages in terms of 
additional cost and length of proceedings, it seems clear that an appellate mechanism could 
nonetheless enhance the coherence, consistency, and, ultimately, (the public perception of) the 
legitimacy of international awards. 
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